Passies en rede in de Schotse Verlichting

Willem Lemmens

School voor comparatieve filosofie

themajaar 2017

21/10/2017

1. De Schotse Verlichting: een eigen geluid in de 18de eeuw

1.1. De Schotse Verlichting

- Gershom Carmichael, Archibald Campbell, James Beattie, Alexander Gerard, George Turnbull, Henry Home (Lord Kames), Dugald Stewart
- Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746)
- David Hume (1711 – 1776)
- Thomas Reid (1710 – 1796)
- Adam Smith (1723 - 1790)
- Adam Ferguson (1723 – 1816)







Francis Hutcheson




David Hume



Adam Smith

Universiteit Antwerpen





"Edinburgh is a hotbed of genius" - Tobias Smollett

“Here I stand at what is called 'The Cross of Edinburgh', and can, in a few minutes, take fifty men of genius and learning by the hand" (Engelse reiziger midden 18de eeuw)

Universiteit Antwerpen

1.2. Sociabiliteit en passies





Thomas Hobbes



Bernard Mandeville


Universiteit Antwerpen

- Francis Hutcheson, *On the Natural Sociability of Mankind* (1730)
- Contra psychologisch egoïsme van Mandeville en Hobbes

- Hume en Smith: *sympathy* (empathie) als intrinsiek mechanisme van menselijke geest – bron van sociale omgang en spontane interesse in de ander
- + conventies van recht & politiek = bron van de moraal

- Afstand van pessimistisch mensbeeld van 17de eeuws Calvinisme in Schotland: idee van 'natuurlijke' goedheid van de mens – *moral sense* is ingeboren


1.3. Natuurlijke religie en Newtonianisme


PHILOSOPHIÆ
NATURALIS
PRINCIPIA
MATHEMATICA

Autore J.S. NEWTONO Trin. Coll. Cantab. Soc. Matheseos Professore Lucasiano, & Societatis Regalis Sodali.

IMPRIMATUR
S. PEPYS, Reg. Soc. PRÆSES.
Julii 5. 1686.

LONDINI,
Justu Societatis Regiæ ac Typis Josephi Streater. Prostat apud plures Bibliopolas. Anno MDCLXXXVII.


48 PHILOSOPHIÆ NATURALIS

De Motu Corporum.

Corol. 4. Iisdem positis, est vis centripeta ut velocitas bis directe, & chorda illa inverse. Nam velocitas est reciproce ut perpendiculum *ST* per corol. 1. prop. 1.

Corol. 5. Hinc si detur figura quævis curvilinea *APQ*, & in ea detur etiam punctum *S*, ad quod vis centripeta perpetuo dirigitur, inveniri potest lex vis centripetæ, qua corpus quodvis *P* a cursu rectilineo perpetuo retractum in figuræ illius perimetro detinebitur, eamque revolvendo describet. Nimirum computandum est vel solidum $\frac{SPq \times QTq}{QR}$ vel solidum $STq \times PV$ huic vi reciproce proportionale. Ejus rei dabimus exempla in problematis sequentibus.

PROPOSITIO VII. PROBLEMA II.

Gyretur corpus in circumferentia circuli, requiritur lex vis centripetæ tendentis ad punctum quodcunque datum.

Esto circuli circumferentia *VQPA*; punctum datum, ad quod vis ceu ad centrum fuum tendit, *S*; corpus in circumferentia latum *P*; locus proximus, in quem movebitur *Q*; & circuli tangens ad locum priorem *PRZ*. Per punctum *S* ducatur chorda *PV*; & acta circuli diametro *VA*, jungatur *AP*; & ad *SP* demittatur perpendiculum *QT*, quod productum occurrat tangenti *PR* in *Z*; ac denique per punctum *Q* agatur *LR*, quæ ipfi *SP* parallela fit, & occurrat tum circulo in *L*, tum tangenti *PZ* in *R*. Et ob fimilia triangula *ZQR*, *ZTP*, *VPA*; erit RP *quad.* hoc eft QRL ad QT *quad.*


8

- Isaac Newton, *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (1687)

- Onttovering van de wereld, intrede van het mechanistische denken (Max Weber) – toch ook sterk Theïsme (Newton was een unitarist)

- Hume, ondertitel van de *Treatise*
- ‘moral subjects’ = alles wat de mens tot mens maakt


- Het vraagstuk van de natuurlijke religie
- Lord Kames, *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion* (1751)
- Rede instrueert ons over orde in de natuur, die zelf verwijst naar goddelijke architect. Kennis van God is ook door rede gegeven op zich. Kritiek van Hume.


A
TREATISE
OF
Human Nature:
BEING
An ATTEMPT to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning
INTO
MORAL SUBJECTS.
Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quæ velis; & quæ sentias, dicere licet. TACIT.
VOL. I.
OF THE
UNDERSTANDING.
LONDON:
Printed for JOHN NOON, at the *White-Hart*, near *Mercer's-Chapel*, in *Cheapside*.
M DCC XXXIX.




Universiteit Antwerpen

1.4. Scepticisme en *Common Sense*



Thomas Reid



Universiteit Antwerpen

- Kenleer en grondslag van de metafysica in de Schotse Verlichting: Scepticisme versus *common sense,* Hume versus Reid


- Thomas Reid: de ‘Immanuel Kant’ van Schotland: vertrouwen in de menselijke rede, mens is zelf onderdeel van een orde die door harmonie en goddelijke voorzienigheid wordt gekenmerkt → theïsme + protestants geloof

- Hume: sceptisch over grondslag rede & natuurlijke religie + Christendom
- Van scepticisme tot naturalisme

1.5. Geschiedenis



Adam Ferguson



Universiteit Antwerpen

2. De ‘moral sense’ school: van passies tot moraliteit

2.1. Hutcheson over sociabiliteit en ‘moral sense’

“*If we may call every determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain*, A SENSE, we shall find many other *Senses* beside those commonly explained.”

Francis Hutcheson, *An essay on the nature and the conduct of the passions and affections, with illustrations on the moral sense* (1728)

Universiteit Antwerpen

Invloed van Lord Shaftesbury (1671 – 1713), *Characteristics*
Sense of virtue = analoog aan sense of beauty
Innerlijke ‘drive’ naar perfectie en harmonie in de mens
Shaftesbury is theïst, maar moraliteit staat los van de religie (‘ware religie’ wel een steun voor de moraal)



Hutcheson
Moral sense = wijze van zien, perceptie van de ander
Sense of honour
Public Sense (Shaftesbury: *sensus communis*)
General and particular benevolence
Zijn alle natuurlijke facetten van de menselijke conditie, rede is instrument van gevoelens, gevoel grond van de moraal

Universiteit Antwerpen

2.2. Hume over passies en morele gevoelens

a) Morele gevoelens en empathie
b) Reactieve attitudes en directe passies
c) Particuliere en algemene welwillendheid
d) Artificiële deugden
e) Een soort ‘heidense deugdethiek’ (cf. zijn morele kritiek van de religie)


Universiteit Antwerpen

“We may begin with considering a-new the nature and force of sympathy. The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations, nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature.”
A Treatise of Human Nature

Universiteit Antwerpen


2.3. Adam Smith over eigenbelang en sympathie

“However selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interests him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. (…) As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.”




Universiteit Antwerpen

- Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.
- I.I.6
- Upon some occasions sympathy may seen to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned. Grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the look and gestures of any one, at once affect the spectator with some degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion. A smiling face is, to every body that sees it, a cheerful object; as a sorrowful countenance, on the other hand, is a melancholy one.




Universiteit Antwerpen

- I.I.7
- This, however, does not hold universally, or with regard to every passion. There are some passions of which the expressions excite no sort of sympathy, but before we are acquainted with what gave occasion to them, serve rather to disgust and provoke us against them. The furious behaviour of an angry man is more likely to exasperate us against himself than against his enemies. As we are unacquainted with his provocation, we cannot bring his case home to ourselves, nor conceive any thing like the passions which it excites. But we plainly see what is the situation of those with whom he is angry, and to what violence they may be exposed from so enraged an adversary. We readily, therefore, sympathize with their fear or resentment, and are immediately disposed to take part against the man from whom they appear to be in so much danger.



Universiteit Antwerpen

- I.I.8
- If the very appearances of grief and joy inspire us with some degree of the like emotions, it is because they suggest to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen the person in whom we observe them: and in these passions this is sufficient to have some little influence upon us. The effects of grief and joy terminate in the person who feels those emotions, of which the expressions do not, like those of resentment, suggest to us the idea of any other person for whom we are concerned, and whose interests are opposite to his. The general idea of good or bad fortune, therefore, creates some concern for the person who has met with it, but the general idea of provocation excites no sympathy with the anger of the man who has received it. Nature, it seems, teaches us to be more averse to enter into this passion, and, till informed of its cause, to be disposed rather to take part against it.



Universiteit Antwerpen

- I.I.9
- Even our sympathy with the grief or joy of another, before we are informed of the cause of either, is always extremely imperfect. General lamentations, which express nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a curiosity to inquire into his situation, along with some disposition to sympathize with him, than any actual sympathy that is very sensible. The first question which we ask is, What has befallen you? Till this be answered, though we are uneasy both from the vague idea of his misfortune, and still more from torturing ourselves with conjectures about what it may be, yet our fellow-feeling is not very considerable.

- I.I.10
- Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it. We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the reality. We blush for the impudence and rudeness of another, though he himself appears to have no sense of the impropriety of his own behaviour; because we cannot help feeling with what confusion we ourselves should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner.